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Abstract
Community decisions about access control in virtual communities are non-monotonic in nature.
This means that they cannot be expressed in current, monotonic trust management languages such
as the family of Role Based Trust Management languages (RT). To solve this problem we propose
RT, which adds a restricted form of negation to the standard RT language, thus admitting a
controlled form of non-monotonicity. The semantics of RT is discussed and presented in terms
of the well-founded semantics for Logic Programs. Finally we discuss how chain discovery can be
accomplished for RT.
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dential to the system can only result in the granting of additional privileges.
Usually, this property is desirable in policy languages [24]. However, banish-
ing negation from an access control language is not a realistic option. In fact,
as stated by Li et al. [17] “many security policies are non-monotonic, or more
easily speciﬁed as non-monotonic ones”; similar views are expressed by Barker
and Stuckey [2] and by Wang et al. [27] in the context of logic-based access
control. This is also true for complex distributed systems such as virtual com-
munities. In particular, as we will show, modelling access control decisions by
a community, as opposed to access control decisions by an individual member,
cannot be made without at least a form of negation, which we call negation-
in-context. As pointed out by Dung and Thang [7] a TM system should be
monotonic with respect to the credential submitted by the client but could be
non-monotonic with respect to the site’s local information about the client.
Our extension allows a TM system to be non-monotonic not only in a local
setting, but also when the context for negation can be provided.
Contributions
We present a signiﬁcant enhancement to the power of the RT family of
trust management languages by proposing RT, an extension of RT0. More
speciﬁcally we:
• add a single new statement type adding negation-in-context to standard
RT;
• present and discuss the declarative semantics of RT;
• show that the extension is essential to specify access control policies for
virtual communities.
• describe a chain discovery algorithm for RT.
Currently, we are using RT to specify and implement virtual community
packages in the context of the Freeband project I-SHARE. In the next section
we discuss how access control policies in virtual communities motivate us to
add negation-in-context to RT. In Section 3 the syntax and informal semantics
of RT is introduced. The formal semantics of RT is presented in Section
4. We present related work in Section 7 and conclusions and future work in
Section 8.
2 Virtual Communities
Virtual communities are groups of individuals with a shared interest, relation-
ship or fantasy [16]. The majority of current virtual communities is interested
in sharing audio/video content using P2P systems [22]. Taking into account
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the distributed nature of virtual communities, special mechanisms for access
control must be provided to ensure secure operations at both intra- and inter-
community levels. As it is often impossible to identify strangers [21], trust
must be established between community members and entities from outside
the community prior to allowing a speciﬁc access. We adopt the solution of
SPKI/SDSI [6], where cryptographic keys are identiﬁed instead of entities.
This assumes that each entity is the sole holder of a particular key. As we do
not want to impose a heavy PKI, the initial trust in a new key will be low,
but this trust will increase over time (with good behaviour).
As an example imagine that Alice (A), Bob (B), and Carol (C) decide to form
a virtual community (or just a community for short). At the beginning they
are the only members of the community, but they welcome others to join.
We represent a community by a list with an entry for each member. Each
entry names the community member and the members it knows about. This
knowledge results from previous interactions with the community members. In
this paper, however, when we say that one knows another community member
we we mean that one is capable of ﬁnding this member later if necessary. Thus,
the “knows” relation is not necessarily commutative, since one entity can decide
to keep track of the other, but not vice versa. For example the following list
represents the community of Alice, Bob, and Carol:
A[B,C] B[A,C] C[A,B]
In this community all members know each other, which means that each mem-
ber can locate any other member when needed. As the community grows it
becomes harder and harder for each member to have complete information
about all other members. Yet the community would like to protect its integ-
rity. Rather than to require involvement of all members in decision making, a
more practical and scalable approach is to allow decisions about membership
to be taken by a group of coordinators selected from the community members.
This group of coordinators itself forms a (sub)community. To ﬁnd all the co-
ordinators we require that the directed graph formed by the "knows" relation
is strongly connected. This means that each coordinator has a relationship
with at least one other coordinator in such a way that all coordinators can be
reached. For example in the list below A knows B, B knows C and C knows
B and A:
A[B] B[C] C[B,A]
To become a member of a community or to become a new coordinator all the
existing coordinators of a given community must approve. Trust management
languages based on logic programming semantics do not support queries of
this kind directly. If one wants to know “if all coordinators approve entity
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A” without explicitly enumerating these coordinators, one must check if the
negation of this statement - “is there any coordinator that does not approve
entity A” - holds. If not, one can conclude that all coordinators approve entity
A. Existing trust management languages [18] are strictly monotonic, thus do
not allow for negation. For this reason they are not suﬃciently expressive
to eﬃciently model complex collaborations that commonly appear in virtual
communities.
Before we can elaborate on this using the example just presented, we need to
review the deﬁnition of RT0, and then present our extension RT.
3 RT
3.1 The RT0 language
RT0 contains two basic elements: entities and role names. Entities represent
uniquely identiﬁed principals, individuals, processes, public keys, etc. Entities
are denoted by names starting with an uppercase letter, for example: A, B,
D, and Alice. A role name begins with a lower case letter. In RT0, roles are
denoted by the entity name followed by the role name, separated by a dot.
For instance A.r and Company.testers are roles. To deﬁne role membership,
RT0 provides four kinds of policy statements:
• A.r ←− D (Simple Membership). Entity D is a member of the role A.r.
• A.r ←− B.r1 (Simple Inclusion). Every member of B.r1 is also a member
of A.r. This represents delegation from entity A to entity B.
• A.r ←− A.r1.r2 (Linking Inclusion). For every entity X who is a member of
A.r1, every member of X.r2 is also a member of A.r. This statement represents
a delegation from entity A to all the members of the role A.r1. The right-hand
side A.r1.r2 is called a linked role.
• A.r ←− B1.r1 ∩ B2.r2 (Intersection Inclusion). Every entity which is a
member of both B.r1 and B.r2 is a member of A.r. This statement represents
partial delegation from the entity A to B1 and to B2. The right-hand side
B1.r1 ∩ B2.r2 is called an intersection role. In a policy statement A.r ←− e
we call A.r the head and e the body. The set of policy statements having the
same head A.r is called the deﬁnition of A.r.
3.2 Extending RT0 with negation
RT0 and other languages from the RT framework do not support negation.
As argued in Section 2, this limits expressiveness. Let us ﬁrst see an example
of negation to enforce the following separation of concerns policy: “developers
cannot be testers of their own code”. We would like to express in RT something
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similar to the LP clause:
verifycode(?A) :- tester(?A), not developer(?A).
where ?A denotes a logical variable. This clause states that A can verify
the code if A is a tester and A is not the developer responsible for the code.
RTDT - another member of the RT framework [18] - supports thresholds
and delegation of role activations; to some extent, RTDT allows to model
separation of concerns without using negation. However, this comes at the cost
of having to deﬁne manifold roles (cumbersome to work with, in practice). In
any case, the examples we present in the sequel cannot be modelled in RTDT .
We deﬁne a new type of statement based on RT0 and a new role-exclusion
operator :
• A.r ←− B1.r1  B2.r2 (Exclusion) All members of B1.r1 which are not
members of B2.r2 are added to A.r.
Example Using the  operator we can solve the separation of concerns prob-
lem as follows:
Company.verifycode ←− Company.tester  Company.developer. (1)
Suppose that both Alice and Bob are testers but Alice is also a developer of
the code:
Company.tester ←− Alice Company.tester ←− Bob
Company.developer ←− Alice
We see that credential 1 does not make Alice be a member of the
Company.verifycode role. Thus, only Bob can verify the code.
3.3 Modelling virtual communities using RT
Having given a simple example and its representation in RT, we now return
to the more complex scenario of community decision making from Section 2.
Recall that we have a community of coordinators - Alice (A), Bob (B), and
Carol (C). Assume that another entity - say D - wants to join this community
and asks Alice for approval. Alice can accept D as a new coordinator locally,
but before making the ﬁnal decision she must check if there is no objection
from other coordinators. A coordinator expresses the objection using a so
called black list. An entity that is on the black list of one of the coordinators
will not be accepted as a new coordinator.
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Table 1
Roles used by coordinators
Deﬁnition (for coordinator A) Description
Op-
tio-
nal
A.agreeToAdd ←−
[set of entities]
A coordinator uses this role to express
that she approves an entity. The role has
a local meaning. It is not suﬃcient to be
a member of the agreeToAdd role to be-
come a coordinator. It is necessary that no
other coordinators says that an entity is a
member of her disagreeToAdd role. The
agreeToAdd role, through the allCandid-
ates role, provides context for the  oper-
ator in the deﬁnition of the the addCoord
role.
A.disagreeToAdd←−
[see description in the text]
This role is used by a coordinator as a
black list.
A.coord←− [set of entities]
This role contains all the coordinators
known by a coordinator.
A.allCoord←− A
A.allCoord←− A.allCoord.coord
This role allows a coordinator to iterate
over all entities connected by the coord
role. This role, if deﬁned, contains all the
coordinators.
✓
A.objectionToAdd←−
A.allCoord.disagreeToAdd
A coordinator can use this role to obtain
all entities for which there is any objec-
tion.
✓
A.allCandidates←−
A.allCoord.agreeToAdd
This role, if deﬁned, contains all the can-
didate coordinators locally accepted by
any of the coordinators. Used as the con-
text for the  operator in the body of the
addCoord role.
✓
A.addCoord ←−
A.allCandidates 
A.objectionToAdd
After becoming a member of this role, a
candidate coordinator becomes a new co-
ordinator and becomes a member of the
coord role.
✓
Table 1 shows the minimal deﬁnition, and the descriptions of the roles used
by coordinators. We see from Table 1 that some roles are mandatory while
the others are not. For instance the role disagreeToAdd must be deﬁned by
each coordinator. On the other hand, the roles allCoord, allCandidates, and
addCoord can be deﬁned as needed by a coordinator. Special attention must be
given to the deﬁnition of the disagreeToAdd role. For example, a coordinator
can use the following credential to say that she distrusts any entity she does
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not accept locally:
A.disagreeToAdd ←− A.allCandidates  A.agreeToAdd.
If a coordinator trusts other coordinators to select candidates she can leave the
agreeToAdd role empty and use her disagreeToAdd role to block some candid-
ates. For example, Alice can put E on her black list to disallow E to become a
coordinator, and simultaneously accept all other candidates proposed by other
coordinators:
A.disagreeToAdd ←− E.
Table 2 shows the roles and their members as seen by Alice, Bob, and Carol. In
this table, we assume that Alice agrees locally to add D as a new coordinator.
Also, Bob and Carol have no objection to add D as a new coordinator, but
E is on Alice’s black list and F is on the black list of Bob and Carol. As a
consequence, only D is the member of the addCoord role of Alice. Bob and
Carol do not have to deﬁne the allCoord, allCandidates 9 , objectionToAdd,
and addCoord unless they themselves add a new coordinator.
Table 2
Adding a new coordinator - D is successful, E, F fail
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Alice (A) {B} {D} {A,B,C} {D} {E} {E,F} {D}
Bob (B) {C} {} ND ∗ ND ∗ {F} ND ∗ ND ∗
Carol (C) {B,A} {} ND ∗ ND ∗ {F} ND ∗ ND ∗
∗ ND = Not Deﬁned
4 Semantics
The semantics of trust management languages is typically given by a trans-
lation into Logic Programming (LP) [18]. We will follow the same route.
Trust management credentials are by deﬁnition distributed among diﬀerent
principals. The use of negation creates an additional diﬃculty, also because
9 A coordinator must deﬁne the allCandidates role if she deﬁnes the disagreeToAdd role in
terms of the agreeToAdd role.
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in logic programming various diﬀerent semantics exist to cope with negation.
We have chosen to use the Well-Founded (WF) semantics [10] for the reasons
sketched below. The WF semantics imposes no restrictions on the syntax of
programs, provides an unique model for each program (as opposed to e.g. the
stable model semantics [11]) and enjoys an elegant ﬁxed-point construction.
The WF semantics basically works as follows (we refer the interested reader
to [10] for details): For a program, consisting of a set of rules, one iteratively
builds positive and negative facts. Positive facts are obtained as usual; any
fact that can be derived by a rule from the already found facts is added.
Negative facts are obtained from ‘unfounded sets’ which contain currently
undecided facts which no rule can derived even when the elements of this set
are set from undecided to false. Thus setting this unfounded set to false will
not create contradictions. As we cannot always obtain a positive or negative
version of each fact, some atoms will remain undecided and be assigned the
value ‘undeﬁned’, i.e. the WF semantics is three valued.
In a TM system it is impossible to avoid circular references, and we can-
not expect policies to be (locally) stratiﬁed. Stratiﬁcation basically means
that one can restructure a logic program into separate parts in such a way
that negative references from one part refer only to previously deﬁned parts.
Without the possibility of local stratiﬁcation we cannot refer to the perfect
model semantics [23]. For the same reason, we certainly have to refer to a
three valued semantics : Next to the truth values true and false, we have to
admit the valued undeﬁned. In short, this is because we cannot expect the
completion of a policy to be a consistent logic program in the sense described
in [25].
The handling of positive circular references, as in {A.r ←− B.r B.r ←−
A.r} should be done in accordance with the semantics of RT0; we should ob-
tain that some entities, for example C, do not belong to A.r. This forces us
to exclude Kunen’s semantics [15] (i.e. the semantics of logical consequences
of the completion of the program together with the weak domain closure as-
sumptions), and Fitting’s semantics [9]: in both semantics the query “does C
belong to A.r?” would return undeﬁned. The WF semantics does return false
for this membership query.
Example 4.1 Consider the program P with the following clauses:
p :- q. q :- p. r :- ¬q. s :- ¬t. t :- ¬s. u :- ¬s.
In the well-founded model of P we have that p and q are false, r is true and s,
t, and u are undeﬁned. (On the other hand, all predicates would be undeﬁned
in Kunen’s semantics.)
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4.1 Translating RT to GLP
We ﬁrst give the translation to LP for RT0 and, using this translation, the se-
mantics of a set of RT0 policy statements. Next we extend this to a translation
from RT to GLP and the semantics for a set of RT policy statements.
The semantics of a set of RT0 policy statements is commonly deﬁned by trans-
lating it into a logic program [18]. Here, we depart from the approach of Li
et al. [18] by referring to the role names as predicate symbols. The state-
ment A.r ←− D is, for example, translated to r(A,D) in the Prolog program.
Intuitively, r(A,D) means that D is a member of the role A.r.
Deﬁnition 4.2 Given a set P of RT0 policy statements, the semantic pro-
gram,SP (P), for P is the logic program deﬁned as follows (recall that symbols
starting with “?” represent logical variables):
• For each A.r ←− D ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A,D)
• For each A.r ←− B.r1 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :- r1(B, ?Z)
• For each A.r ←− A.r1.r2 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :-
r1(A, ?Y ), r2(?Y, ?Z)
• For each A.r ←− B.r1 ∩ B.r2 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :-
r1(B1, ?Z), r2(B2, ?Z)
The semantics of a role A.r is a set of members Z that make the predicate
r(A,Z) true in the semantic program: [[A.r]]P = {Z |SP (P) |= r(A,Z)}
We write SP (P ) |= r(A,Z) if r(A,Z) is true in the unique well-founded model
of P . (For negation-free programs this model coincides with the least Herbrand
model used for the semantics of RT0 by Li at al [18].) We now extend the
translation of RT0 to that of RT by adding the translation of the exclusion
rule.
Deﬁnition 4.3 Given a set P of RT policy statements, the semantic pro-
gram, SP (P), for P is the general logic program deﬁned as follows:
• For each A.r ←− B.r1  B.r2 ∈ P add to SP (P) the clause r(A, ?Z) :-
r1(B1, ?Z),¬r2(B2, ?Z)
• All other rules are as in deﬁnition 4.2.
The semantics of a role A.r is a set of members Z that make the predicate
r(A,Z) true in the semantic program: [[A.r]]P = {Z |SP (P) |= r(A,Z)}
Note that, unlike before, the value of the semantical program may give value
‘undeﬁned’ for r(A,Z). In this case the agent Z is not considered to be a
member of the role, nor of the negated role.
Example 4.4 Consider a system with entities A,B,C,D, roles A.r, B.r and
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C.r and the following policy rules:
A.r ←− B.r  C.r C.r ←− B.r  A.r B.r ←− D
Here D is a member of B.r, however, D is not a member of either A.r or
C.r. Note that as a result we have that despite the presence of the rule
A.r ←− B.rC.r the role B.r can have members that are neither in A.r nor
in C.r.
The rules for A.r and C.r in the example above are referred to as negative
circular dependencies; A.r depends negatively on C.r and C.r, in turn, depends
negatively on A.r. The example shows that care is required when reasoning
about policies which have negative circular dependencies.
4.2 Virtual Communities - translation to GLP
Having introduced an example of virtual community decision making in Sec-
tion 2, its formalism in Subsection 3.3, we now give the GLP semantics of
the example. Translating RT credentials to GLP is straightforward using
the rules presented in Subsection 4.1. For the convenience of the reader we
present a complete policy and the corresponding GLP rules in Appendix A.
If one asks Alice to add D to the group of coordinators she needs to check
if D is a member of the A.addCoord. This is equivalent to checking whether
addCoord(A,D) holds after the translation to GLP. She does this by checking
whether D is a logical consequence of the semantic program SP (P) by ﬁrst
ﬁnding the semantics of the role A.addCoord and checking if it contains entity
D. The semantics of the role A.addCoord with respect to the program P is
as follows:
A.addCoordP = {D}.
The semantics of the roles A.allCandidates and A.objectionToAdd (these roles
deﬁne the role A.addCoord) are shown below:
A.allCandidatesP = {D} A.objectionToAddP = {E,F}.
The semantics of a role may also be an empty set: B.agreeToAddP = {}.
5 Credential Chain Discovery
In this section we extend the standard chain discovery algorithm to RT fol-
lowing the construction of the well-founded semantics. Recall that the deﬁni-
tion of a role A.r is the set of all credentials with head A.r. We assume that A
stores (or at least, is able to ﬁnd) the complete deﬁnition of each of her roles
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A.r, i.e. that the credentials involved are issuer-traceable. The main diﬃculty
in the chain discovery is to obtain that B is not a member of a linked role
A.r.r′. For this we need to check that every potential member C of A.r does
not have B in its role C.r′. So who are the potential members of A.r? Thanks
to negation in context we can provide a reasonable overestimation of this set
using chain discovery for RT0:
Deﬁnition 5.1 For a policy P the context policy P+ is the policy obtained
by replacing each credential of the form A.r ←− B1.r1B2.r2 ∈ P by A.r ←−
B1.r1 and leaving the other credentials unchanged. We call [[A.r]]P+ the context
of the role A.r.
The following lemma relates roles with their contexts.
Lemma 5.2 For any policy P and role A.r we have: If SP (P) |= r(A,B)
then SP (P+) |= r(A,B) and if SP (P+) |= r(A,B) then SP (P) |= ¬r(A,B).
The ﬁrst part of this lemma states that any role is contained in its context,
[[A.r]]P ⊆ [[A.r]]P+. If B ∈ [[A.r]]P this means that r(A,B) is undeﬁned or
false in SP (P). The second part of the lemma states that if B ∈ [[A.r]]P+ it
must be the latter, r(A,B) is false in SP (P). In the algorithm below we build
a set of credentials C together with a set of context membership facts I+ and
a set of positive and negative membership facts I.
Step 1. Initialise I = ∅, I+ = ∅ and C = the deﬁnition of role A.r.
Step 2. Discover context and credentials (classical chain discovery for I+
and C).
We look for new credentials top down; any credential that could possibly be
relevant for role A.r is added to C. We look for the context of A.r bottom up;
any fact that can be derived from the credentials that we have found is added
to I+. Repeat the following until no changes occur: For each credential of
the following form in C:
[B.r0 ←− C] add r0(B,C) to I+
[B.r0 ←− C.r1] add the deﬁnition of C.r1 to C and add r0(B,D) to I+ for
all r1(C,D) in I+
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1 ∩ C2.r2] add the deﬁnitions of C1.r1 and C2.r2 to C add
r0(B,D) to I+ whenever r1(C1, D) and r2(C2, D) in I+.
[B.r0 ←− C.r1.r2] add the deﬁnition of C.r1 and, for each r1(C,D) ∈ I+,
the deﬁnition of D.r2 to C. Add r0(B,D) to I+ whenever for some Y we have
r1(C, Y ) and r2(Y,D) in I+.
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1  C2.r2] add the deﬁnitions of C1.r1 and C2.r2 to C, add
r0(B,D) to I for every r1(C1, D)
Step 3. Discover positive facts in I (extended chain discovery 1).
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We update I similar to I+ in the previous step, only the last case () changes.
Repeat until I does not change, for credentials in C of the following form:
[B.r0 ←− C] add r0(B,C) to I
[B.r0 ←− C.r1] add r0(B,D) to I for all r1(C,D) in I
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1∩C2.r2] add r0(B,D) to I whenever r1(C1, D) and r2(C2, D)
in I.
[B.r0 ←− C.r1.r2] Add r0(B,D) to I whenever for some Y we have
r1(C, Y ) and r2(Y,D) in I.
[B.r0 ←− C1.r1  C2.r2] add r0(B,D) to I whenever r1(C1, D) ∈ I and
either (¬r2(C2, D)) ∈ I or r2(C2, D) ∈ I+.
Step 4. Discover negative facts in I (extended chain discovery 2).
We search for facts which are useful when negated in I: Initialise U = ∅. We
say an atom r(X, Y ) is not yet false (NYF) if it is a member of the context
and not assumed or known to be false, i.e. r(X, Y ) ∈ I+, r(X, Y ) ∈ U and
¬r(X, Y ) ∈ I. A fact r2(C2, D) is useful if it is not yet false and ¬r2(C2, D)
can be used to derive a fact, i.e. B.r0 ←− C1.r1C2.r2 ∈ C and r1(C1, D) ∈ I.
Choose one useful fact and add it to U .
Next we try to show that facts in U are false by showing that no rule can
possibly derive a fact in U . To achieve this we may need to assume that other
facts are also false, i.e. add them to U .
For each fact r(B,D) in U and matching rule B.r ←− e ∈ C perform:
[B.r ←− C] Do nothing.
[B.r ←− C.r1] This rule cannot be used to derive r(B,D) if r1(C,D) is
false thus if r1(C,D) is NYF then add it to U .
[B.r ←− C1.r1 ∩ C2.r2] If r1(C1, D) and r2(C2, D) are both NYF then
choose one to add to U .
[B.r ←− C1.r1  C2.r2] If r1(C1, D) is NYF and r2(C2, D) ∈ I then add
r1(C1, D) to U .
[B.r ←− C.r1.r2] For all Y with r1(C, Y ) NYF: If r2(Y,D) is NYF choose
one of r1(C, Y ) and r2(Y,D) and add it to U .
 Try each possible choice in the substep above and if the resulting U has
no elements in common with I then add ¬U to I.
Repeat steps 3 and 4 until I remains unchanged.
(End of algorithm.) The algorithm correctly ﬁnds the members of the role
A.r:
∀B : r(A,B) ∈ I ⇐⇒ B ∈ [[A.r]]P
It follows the steps in the construction of the well-founded semantics in such
a way that I is, at each stage, a suﬃciently large subset of the well-founded
model.
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6 Implementation
In the current prototype storage is centralised and we assume that all cre-
dentials can be traced by the issuer. In such a case, Linear resolution with
Selection function for General logic programs (SLG) resolution of XSB pro-
log can be used to compute answers to queries according to the WF model
for RT [5]. XSB is a research-oriented, commercial-grade Logic Program-
ming system for Unix and Windows-based platforms. XSB provides standard
prolog functionality but also supports negations and constraints. Using SLG
resolution XSB prolog can correctly answer queries for which standard prolog
gets lost in an inﬁnite branch of a search tree, where it may loop inﬁnitely.
A number of interfaces to other software systems including Java and ODBC
are available. DLV datalog [8] and the Smodels system [20] can also be used
to provide an initial implementation of RT. The DLV system [8] is a sys-
tem for disjunctive logic programs. It is distributed as a command line tool
for both Windows and Linux operation systems. DLV is capable of dealing
with disjunctive logic programs without function symbols allowing for strong
negations, constraints and queries. DLV uses two diﬀerent notions of nega-
tion: negation as failure and true (or explicit) negation. By default, DLV
handles negation as failure by constructing the stable model semantics for
the program. This standard behaviour can be changed using a command line
option and then a WF model is built instead. The true or explicit negation
expresses the facts that explicitly are known to be false. On the contrary,
negation as failure does not support explicit assertion of falsity. Models of
programs containing true negation are also called “answer sets”. The Smodels
system [20] provides an implementation of the well-founded and stable model
semantics for range-restricted function-free normal programs. The Smodels
system allows for eﬃcient handling of non-stratiﬁed ground programs and
supports extensions including built-in functions, cardinality, and weight con-
straints. The Smodels system is available either as a C++ library that can be
called from user programs or as a stand-alone program with default front-end
(lparse). We implemented the program introduced in sub-section 4.3 on three
systems: XSB, Smodels and DLV. To test the performance of the program
on these systems, we use two parameters: number of coordinators (Coords)
and number of iterations (Iters). The higher the number of coordinators is,
the more complex the program is. The program is also executed repeatedly
to compare performance more correctly. Table A.2 in the appendix reports
the execution time of the program measured by the CPU time obtained. We
cannot compare the execution time between XSB and the other two DLV and
Smodels because XSB is the goal-oriented system while DLV and Smodels
build and return the whole model for the program. Because of this XSB is
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faster than the other two systems. DLV provides better execution time than
Smodels, especially when the complexity of the program increases.
7 Related Work
So far little attention has been given to trust management in virtual communit-
ies. Most of the existing approaches focus on reputation-based trust models
in P2P networks [26]. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [1] propose a trust model
that is based on real world social trust characteristics. They also ﬁnd formal
logic based trust management to be ill suited as a general model of trust. To
prove this claim they refer to the early work of Burrows and Abadi [4], and
Gong, Needham, and Yahalom [12], which are more relevant to formal protocol
veriﬁcation than to formal reasoning on trust management. To support their
work they claim that logic based trust management systems are not suitable to
be automated - the existing literature on automated trust negotiation (ATN)
yields a contradictory statement (see Seamons et al. [24]). Pearlman et al. [21]
present a Community Authorisation Service - a central management unit for
a community that helps to enforce the policy of a virtual community. Such a
central point of responsibility does not ﬁt well in the spirit of P2P networks
because of their highly distributed nature. Pearlman et al. also require that
there a centralised policy exists for a virtual community. However, the policy
of a virtual community may have a distributed character and can be seen as
a product of the policies of the community members. Boella and van der
Torre [3] take the same direction and emphasise the distinction between au-
thorisations given by the Community Authorisation Service and permissions
granted by resource providers in virtual communities of agents. They regard
authorisation as a means used by community authorities to regulate the ac-
cess of customers to resources that are not under control of these authorities.
According to Boella and van der Torre, permission can be granted only by the
actual resource owner.
As we conclude in Section 2, virtual communities are also not supported
by the existing trust management languages, even though the general require-
ments for such languages have been investigated [24].
Herzberg et al. propose in [13] a prolog-based trust management language
(DTPL) together with a non-monotonic version of it (TPL). Their approach
is very diﬀerent from ours in the sense that TLP allows for negative certiﬁc-
ates namely “certiﬁcates which are interpreted as suggestions not to trust a
user”. This far-reaching approach leads to a more complex logical interpreta-
tion, which includes conﬂict resolution. As opposed to this, our approach is
technically simpler and enjoys a well-established semantics. Jajodia et al. [14],
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Wang et al. [27], Barker and Stuckey [2], have in common that they impose a
stratiﬁed use of negation. Because of this, they can refer to the perfect model
semantics. As we explained in Section 4, in the context of DTM, we cannot
expect policies to be stratiﬁed. Our approach is thus more powerful than the
approaches based on the stratiﬁable negation. Dung and Thang in [7] propose
a DTM system based on logic programming and the stable model semantics
[11].
8 Conclusions and future work
We present the language RT, which adds a construct for ‘negation-in-context’
to the RT0 trust management system. We argue the necessity of such a con-
struct and illustrate its use with scenarios from virtual communities which
cannot be expressed within the RT framework.
We provide a semantics for RT by translation to general logic programs.
We show that, given the complete policy, the membership relation can be de-
cided by running the translation in systems such as XSB, DLV datalog and
Smodels. We also show how, for the case that credentials are issuer trace-
able [19], the chain discovery algorithm for RT0 can be extended to RT.
We are currently employing RT to specify virtual community policies in the
Freeband project I-SHARE. In the future we plan to examine the complex-
ity of the presented chain discovery algorithm, ad hoc methods to minimise
communication overhead, and safe methods for chain discovery in non-‘issuer
traces all’ scenarios. A comparison with reputation systems will also be made.
In section 5 we have assumed that the credentials are issuer traceable and
that we are able to obtain all relevant credentials. In our scenario this is
realistic; as the coordinators play a central role, they are generally assumed to
be available suﬃciently often and have suﬃcient resources to store their own
credentials. In general collecting all credentials can be diﬃcult, for example,
credentials may be stored elsewhere, entities may be unreachable or messages
may be lost. In such a situation, we cannot safely determine that A is not in
B’s role r by absence of credentials. Instead we could ask B to explicitly state
that A is not a member of B.r. This is suﬃcient if we know the context of
a role (and thus which negative facts we need). More advanced mechanisms
to guarantee safety of roles and a precise deﬁnition of which policies are safe
using which mechanism is subject of further research.
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Appendix A
Table A.1
Virtual Community - translation to GLP
RT rules GLP semantics
A.addCoord←− A.allCandidates 
A.objectionToAdd
A.allCandidates←−
A.allCoord.agreeToAdd
A.objectionToAdd←−
A.allCoord.disagreeToAdd
A.disagreeToAdd←− A.allCandidates 
A.agreeToAdd
A.allCoord←− A.allCoord.coord
A.allCoord←− A
A.coord←− B
B.coord←− C
C.coord←− B
C.coord←− A
A.agreeToAdd←− D
A.disagreeToAdd←− E
B.disagreeToAdd←− F
C.disagreeToAdd←− F
addCoord(A, ?Y ):- allCandidates(A, ?Y ),
¬objectionToAdd(A, ?Y ).
allCandidates(A, ?Y ):- allCoord(A, ?Z),
agreeToAdd(?Z, ?Y ).
objectionToAdd(A, ?Y ):- allCoord(A, ?Z),
disagreeToAdd(?Z, ?Y ).
disagreeToAdd(A, ?Y ):- allCandidates(A, ?Y ),
¬agreeToAdd(A, ?Y ).
allCoord(A, ?Y ):- allCoord(A, ?Z),
coord(?Z, ?Y ).
allCoord(A,A).
coord(A,B).
coord(B,C).
coord(C,B).
coord(C,A).
agreeToAdd(A,D).
disagreeToAdd(A,E).
disagreeToAdd(B,F ).
disagreeToAdd(C,F ).
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Table A.2
Execution time of the program on the XSB, SMODELS, and DLV systems
10 Coords 30 Coords 50 Coords
Num. of Iterations Num. of Iterations Num. of Iterations
1 10 20 1 10 20 1 10 20
DLV 0.05s 0.81s 1.54s 0.06s 0.83s 1.55s 0.07s 0.86s 1.60s
SMODELS 0.12s 1.22s 2.32s 0.16s 1.35s 2.66s 0.19s 1.53s 2.94s
XSB ≈ 0
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